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NPDES program, as opposed to a substantive requirement. Further, the notification requirement referred to EPA approval of a state's permit program, not
a state's approval of individual pernits. Finally, the Court concluded that the
Askinses' reading of the notification requirement as a condition was contradictory to NPDES requirements, specifically that state and federal permit conditions be the same. As such, the Court held that the CWA's notification requirement is not a permit "condition."
Third, the Court determined whether there existed a private cause of action
against regulators for violations of procedural regulations. The Court concluded that if Congress intended the citizen suit provision to permit the
Askinses' claim, it would have included language in the explicidy enumerated
circumstances permitting suit. Further, if the citizen suit provision were so expansive as to permit this claim, the provision's remedies would give it more
teeth than the U.S. EPA itself has, by way of the provision's shorter notice period and availability of civil penalties and costs. This is not the case because
Congress intended the citizen suit provision to supplement the regulators' authority. Additionally, cases that considered other, identical citizen suit provisions reached the same conclusion as this Court. Therefore, the Court held,
the CWA citizen suit provision did not permit a private right of action against a
non-polluting regulator for procedural violations.
Finally, the Court considered whether the U.S. EPA failed to perform a
non-discretionary duty. The Court held that the CWA does not require the
U.S. EPA to hold a hearing. Should the U.S. EPA choose to hold a hearing,
the CWA requires it to withdraw approval of a state-NPDES progran after
hearing, proper notice, and time to address the issue. That is to say, the CWA
does not require a hearing in the first place; therefore it is not a non-discretionary duty. The U.S. EPA did not hold a hearing in the present case, so no nondiscretionary duties arose. Thus, the CWA did not permit the Askinses' citizen
suit
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Tim Berrier
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm'n v. U.S. Envt Prot. Agency, 791 F.3d
1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding the Clean Water Act neither requires the EPA to
satisfy each of the criteria in the statute when issuing an oil exploration waste
discharge permit, nor determine reasonable alternatives to on-site disposal of
wastes, and that the Clean Water Act does not require the EPA to incorporate
the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and oil companies' agreed migrating
measures into discharge permits).
The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission ("AEWC") represents several
native Alaskan villages engaged in subsistence hunting of bowhead whales in the
Beaufort Sea. The AEWC challenged a wastewater discharge permit ("Permit") that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued to oil exploration companies. The Permit authorized discharge of thirteen waste streams into
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the Beaufort Sea. The Permit mandated limitations and monitoring requirements, which barred discharge during the fall bowhead whale-hunting season.
Despite these measures, the AEWC claimed that the EPA failed to adequately
consider how the authorized discharges would impose on subsistence communities' fall whale hunt. The AEWC contended that the discharges would divert
the whales further from their migratory routes, making the hunt less productive
and more dangerous.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Court") had
jurisdiction to review the Permit, in accordance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") provisions within the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). AEWC petitioned the Court to remand the Permit to the EPA for
further proceedings leading to additional restrictions. The Court reviewed the
action under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, which generally states that the EPA's action is presumed to be valid
and must be affirmed if a "reasonable basis" exists for its decisions.
The EPA produced three documents to explain its decision: (i) the Response to Commrents, which included all the comments the EPA received from
the community when drafting the Permit; (ii) its Ocean Discharge Criteria Evaluation ("ODCE"); and (iii) its EnvironmentalJustice Analysis. In the Response
to Comments, the EPA wrote that non-contact cooling water would not cause
an unreasonable degradation to the marine environment because its analysis
indicated the discharge's temperature would dissipate within "100 meters of the
discharge location." In the ODCE, the EPA stated that authorized discharges
would dissipate and dilute to "approximately 600:1 at 100 meters from the discharge point." However, the day before oral argument, the EPA submitted a
letter to the Court that acknowledged a mistake in the record, in which the
model it cited in support of its statements did not include non-contact cooling
water, but actually referred to drilling-related effluents.
Faced with this discovery, the Court remanded to the EPA to reconsider its
determination that non-contact cooling water discharge would not cause "unreasonable degradation of the marine environment," and to submit specific evidence regarding the effects of that discharge on the bowhead whale migration.
The AEWC next argued that the EPA failed to base its decision on two
considerations listed in the CWA for determining degradation of marine waters.
The Court determined that the CWA set forth considerations that the EPA
must follow when "promulgating its own regulations, not the criteria that EPA
must apply to each permitting decision it makes." The Court concluded that
those criteria did not apply to this case.
The Court weighed whether the EPA's application of its regulatory criteria
was arbitrary or capricious. To begin this inquiry, the Court examined 40 C.F.R
§ 125.123 that provides criteria under which the EPA issues discharge permits.
Paragraph (a) of the statute states that "[iIf the director on the basis of available
information... determines prior to permit issuance that the discharge will not
cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment after application of
any necessary conditions... he may issue an NPDES permit containing such
conditions."
In support of its position, the AEWC first contended that paragraph (c) of
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the statute applied to this case. That paragraph stipulates that the EPA must
determine there were no other reasonable alternatives other than on-site disposal of materials. However, the Court held that there was no evidence in the
record, nor in the regulations, to support the claim that paragraph (c) applied
to this proceeding.
Second, the AEWC argued the evidence did not support a finding that discharges other than non-contact cooling water will not cause an "unreasonable
degradation of the marine environment." The AEWC's challenge of the EPA's
evidentiary analysis was based on two CWA criteria: (i) the potential impact the
discharge will have on human health; and (ii) "[sluch other factors relating to
the effects of the discharge as may be appropriate."
The Court disagreed with the AEWC, holding that the record was "replete
with evidence" that the EPA fully considered the AEWC's concerns and that it
considered the CWA's criteria in making its determination. Therefore, the
Court held that the EPA was not arbitrary or capricious in issuing the Permit.
Third, the AEWC argued that the EPA did not provide a rational explanation of how the EPA's monitoring program would prevent conflict with subsistence use and that the EPA acted arbitrary and irrational in relying on such monitoring programs. Again, the Court disagreed with the AEWC. It found that
the detailed description of the monitoring program included requirements for
monthly monitoring, post-drilling reports, and ongoing monitoring of marine
mammal deflection during discharges. Based on these requirements, the Court
held there was no basis for concluding that the EPA's design and implementation of the monitoring program was arbitrary or capricious.
Finally, the AEWC contended that the EPA should adopt the same nitigation measures that the National Marine Fisheries Services ("NMFS") adopted.
These are the same measures the AEWC, Shell Gulf Oil of Mexico, and Shell
Offshore, Inc. agreed to in a separate Conflict Avoidance Agreement. The
Court held that the EPA was not required to adopt those terms because the
AEWC identified no legal authority requiring such measures. The Court found
no measures that would mandate the EPA to incorporate the NMFS mitigation
measure or the Conflict Avoidance Agreement into the Permit.
Accordingly, the Court remanded to the EPA for a determination of
whether the discharge of non-contact cooling water would cause an "unreasonable degradation of the marine environment," and denied the petition in all
other respects.
Vann A. Ellerbruch
Alaska Wilderness League v.Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court's ruling that: (i) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement's approval of the challenged oil spill response plans was not arbitrary and capricious; (ii) the Endangered Species Act did not require the Bureau
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to consult with any enviromnental
agencies before approving oil spill response plans; (iii) the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement was entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act; and (iv) the National Environmental Policy Act
did not require the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to do an

